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The European Neighbourhood Policy has, from its very beginning, 
seized the attention of scholars and has remained high ever since on 
the academic agenda. Among the large number of publications al-
ready produced, many have analyzed ENP objectives, methods and 
influence through a comparison with EU enlargement policy toward 
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990’s. This paper argues that 
an alternative picture of the ENP can be obtained through a com-
parison of policy rationale and implementation in two countries – 
one benefiting from the policy, Ukraine and the second having re-
jected it, Russia. Such comparison highlights discrepancies between 
(i) a discourse focusing on differentiation among countries (within 
and without the policy), (ii) the similarity of policy patterns and in-
struments proposed by the EU to Ukraine and Russia, and (iii) dif-
ferences  between  Ukraine  and  Russia  in  policy  reception,  which 
contribute to shape two distinct modes of policy implementation (se-
lective adaptation in the case of Russia and accommodated condi-
tionality in the case of Ukraine).  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)’s genesis and motiva-
tions are already well known. The policy was designed to “avoid 
new dividing lines in Europe” and to “promote stability and pros-
perity” across the continent (European Commission 2003). In other 
words, the ENP is an EU initiative to shape its environment and 
frame the growing interdependence between an enlarged Union and 
its new neighbours.  
Within a very short timeframe, this initiative has been widely publi-
cized by the European Union, in particular through a specific EC 
Website
1 dedicated to the new policy, designed with a view to dif-
fusing the already rich corpus of policy documents and  disseminat-
ing EU discourse. Interestingly, the special relationship to be devel-
oped with the new neighbours was also enshrined in the EU Consti-
tutional Treaty, which was signed only a few months after the ENP 
was launched
2.   
Both ENP’s declared ambitions and the importance given by the EU 
to a brand new policy – defined as the main EU’s external priority – 
suggests that the ENP may have considerable effects and create new 
modes  of  governance  on  the  continent.  To  what  extent  does  the 
ENP bring changes in EU foreign policy and, more specifically, to 
what  extent  does  it  make  a  difference  in  EU  relations  with  its 
neighbours? 
To assess the changes brought in by the ENP, this paper will build 
an analysis grid articulating two dimensions: the theoretical frame-
work used for thinking the ENP so far and empirical observations 
drawn from policy implementation. The first part of this paper will 
review the academic publications on the ENP, highlight their focus 
                                                 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm  
2 Title VIII, Article I-57 of the Treaty provides :  
“1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on 
the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based 
on cooperation.  
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements 
with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and 
obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their im-
plementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.” 120  European Political Economy Review  
   
and point out possible analysis gaps. The second part will then pro-
pose an alternative approach in the study of the ENP, emphasizing 
policy  implementation,  in  particular  policy  reception.  Such  ap-
proach will be developed in a third part through a comparison of EU 
relations  with  a  country  benefiting  from  the  ENP  (Ukraine)  and 
with another country formally left out of the policy (Russia).  
 
 
2.  Scholars and the ENP: An Overview  
Among  EU  external  policies,  the  ENP  has  received  an  unprece-
dented interest from the academic community, starting from its very 
beginning (cf. in particular Wallace 2003; Cremona 2004; Grabbe 
2004). The number of conferences, papers, seminars, books and ar-
ticles  dedicated  to  the  neighbourhood  policy  over  the  last    four 
years make it the first external EU policy to attract such large atten-
tion from scholars within a very short timeframe
3. Think-tanks have 
also devoted a number of working papers to the new policy, either 
in the EU (including in new Member States) or in the neighbouring 
countries
4. 
How can the academic activity on the ENP be assessed? In analys-
ing the huge literature already produced, attention will be paid to 
the  methodological  and  analytical  focuses  and  the  conclusions 
scholars have drawn from their observation. The ambition here is 
not to provide the reader with an exhaustive review of the literature 
on the ENP, even though such exercise has not been carried out yet. 
This section aims rather at getting an insight into the literature to 
highlight the main analysis grids which have been used to study the 
ENP.  
                                                 
3 For instance, within the last six months: “The European Neighbourhood Policy: 
A Framework for Modernization?”, European University Institute, Florence, 1
st-
2
nd December 2006; “Politique de voisinage et sécurité. Défis, objectifs, moyens”, 
Centre Universitaire de Södertörn et Ecole supérieure de la Défense Nationale, 
Stockholm, 29 November – 1
st December 2006; “A New Impetus for the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy”, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 10-11 
October  2006;  “Wider  Europe  Conference”,  Sussex  European  Institute,  Kyiv, 
summer 2006. 
4 Cf. for instance the research and policy advice performed (among others) by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies and the European Policy Centre in Brussels, 
the Batory Foundation in Warsaw, the Institute for International Relations in Pra-
gue, the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv. Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  121 
 
2.1  Enlargement as a core reference for ENP analysis 
When looking at the content of the analyses produced so far on the 
ENP, the most striking feature is that they overwhelmingly consider 
the  1990’s  enlargement  process  as  a  reference  to  study  the 
neighbourhood policy.  
A majority of academics referring to enlargement analyzes the ENP 
from the point of view of policy emission and points out the exis-
tence of a strong correlation between enlargement and neighbour-
hood policies.   
Such conclusion is based upon the analysis of the neighbourhood 
policy’s creation, which corresponded in time with the  admission 
of ten new Member States into the EU. Starting in 2001-2002, EU 
attention  was  shifted  onto  external  consequences  of  enlargement 
(Delcour 2006), specifically on the need to address security chal-
lenges at the borders of the future enlarged EU (Cremona 2004). 
The prospect of enlargement and the growing awareness that it may 
act “as a divisive and destabilising factor” (Cremona 2004:4) were 
thus instrumental in giving rise to a discussion on “Wider Europe” 
in several EU Member States and candidates countries, and within 
the Commission and the Council (Delcour 2006).   
Beyond  the  rationale  and  the  agenda-setting  phase,  a  number  of 
publications  shows  that  the  ENP  very  design  originate  in  the 
enlargement policy. Marise Cremona (2004:4) argues that the ”basis 
of the ENP can be found in the recent enlargement of the Union”. 
Elsa Tulmets analyses the transfer of policy modes from one policy 
to another and highlights four levels of adaptation: discourse (the 
use  in  the  ENP  discourse  of  conditionality,  replicating  accession 
conditions); principles (key principles of the ENP – differentiation, 
decentralisation- are also based upon the enlargement experience); 
policy modes with the use in the ENP of a benchmarked approach 
which  is  the  trademark  of  the  open  method  of  coordination  and 
which  was  originally  transferred  from  internal  policies  into  the 
enlargement policy (Tulmets 2005); and finally, tools: the replica-
tion in the ENP of assistance tools created for the enlargement pol-
icy, such as TAIEX and Twinnings. Inspiration from the enlarge-
ment process is particularly strong in the main ENP tool, the Action 122  European Political Economy Review  
   
Plans, either in the very content and drafting for the first ones
5, or, 
more  importantly,  in  a  method  based  upon  bilateral  negotiation, 
conditionality and benchmarking, which links the strengthening of 
the relations together with the progress achieved by partners coun-
tries in the respect of  political commitments and common values 
(Emerson  2004;  Kelley  2006;  Tulmets  2006;  Cremona,  Hillion 
2006). Thus, for Judith Kelley the most convincing evidence of pol-
icy transfer stands in the combination of socialization and condi-
tionality  strategies  already  used  in  the  enlargement  process  and, 
from an institutional point of view, in the transfer of staff from DG 
Enlargement into the new Wider Europe Task Force (Kelley 2006).  
How do academics explain the transfer of enlargement methods to 
the ENP? While the EC justifies such modelling by a search for ef-
fectiveness - enlargement being described as the most effective EU 
foreign policy tool (Landaburu, 2006, Rehn, 2006)-, scholars point 
out the limits of its rationality. Urgency has been identified as a key 
factor  in  the  ENP  agenda-setting  and  policy  formulation  phases 
(Delcour 2006), thus compelling EU institutions to draw upon pre-
vious experiences for building the new neighbourhood policy. Re-
ferring to organizational management and policy transfer theories, 
Judith Kelley argues that this corresponds a “mechanical borrow-
ing” (Kelley 2006: 32) even if it results in a more active role for the 
Commission in EU foreign policy
6. She explains the ENP modelling 
on  enlargement  policy    through  a  strong  path  dependency,  thus 
stressing a mechanism of policy lock-in within the Commission for 
shaping the ENP. While agreeing with the transfer of enlargement 
methods to the ENP, other scholars show that the process is much 
more complex than suggested by Kelley’s “mechanical borrowing”. 
Elsa Tulmets (2006), for instance, puts the emphasis on the adapta-
tion of enlargement methods to the neighbourhood context, thus ac-
knowledging less rationality to EU institutions in the ENP formula-
                                                 
5 According to Judith Kelley, “some early drafts of the Action Plans were mod-
elled directly on the association agreements used for recent accessions” (Kelley 
2006:32) 
6 With respect to the enlargement process, Cécile Robert had already shown how 
the design and implementation of the enlargement policy allowed the Commis-
sion to gain leadership in the EU system in particular through mobilizing exper-
tise (a function upon which the Commission had a monopoly in the enlargement 
process),  and  through  articulating  technical  analysis  and  policy  challenges 
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tion. This process of adaptation has resulted in a flexible policy, 
which, she argues, is evolving towards variable geometry (Tulmets 
2006: 29). 
The main conclusions which are drawn from this comparison be-
tween enlargement and neighbourhood policies relate to policy im-
pact. Here, the bulk of papers published points out the differences 
with the enlargement process. The main difference stems from a 
lack of “carrots”(or incentives for reform) in neighbouring countries 
when compared to 1990’s candidates. For instance, the financial in-
centives offered under the ENP are considered to be far from gener-
ous  when  compared  to  assistance  provided  under  the  Phare  pro-
gramme (Tulmets 2006). Kelley (2006) focuses on political incen-
tives  and  argues  that  the  EU  even  could  loose  its  attractiveness 
without the political and voting rights granted by membership. Ac-
cording to several other scholars, the use of enlargement methods 
could be even more discouraging for neighbours as the expectations 
regarding  accession  are  high  in  several  neighbouring  countries, 
whereas the ENP does not offer any membership prospect. Thus, 
the ENP is often mentioned as a “substitute to enlargement” (Tul-
mets 2006), not able to yield similar benefits because its finalité dif-
fers. Ultimately, the discrepancy between the use of enlargement 
methods and the lack of accession prospect raises the question of 
policy legitimacy and legitimization (Goujon 2005). 
 
2.2  The ENP as a shift in literature on EU external action? 
Overall, this brief insight into some of the papers published on the 
ENP stresses a “spill-over” from internal policy areas (enlargement, 
which has itself drawn upon other internal policies methods) to ex-
ternal ones (the ENP). From a methodological point of view, this 
focus on enlargement also reflects a shift in the literature on EU ex-
ternal action based upon increasing references to - and linkages with 
– EU internal integration for the study of an external policy. Such 
approach is linked to the growing blurring of boundaries between 
internal and external governance (Lavenex 2004). 
To  what  extent  does  “the  extension  of  governance  beyond  EU 
member  states  constitute  a  new  perspective  on  EU  international 
role”(Lavenex 2004: 682)?  124  European Political Economy Review  
   
It is argued here that publications analyzing this extension to the 
ENP have contributed to fill the gaps in the existing literature on 
EU external action. Since the 1970s, the external developments of 
European integration have given rise to a number of publications, 
which Franck Petiteville divides into three strands based upon their 
core theme: first, analyses of the institutionalisation of a European 
foreign policy; second, analyses of key policies developed abroad 
by the EU and of their impact; finally, theorization of the EU’s in-
ternational action (Petiteville 2006). Shortcomings of the existing 
literature have been noted by Michèle Knodt and Sebastian Princen 
(2003)  and  later  by  Christopher  Hill  and  Michael  Smith  (2005). 
Knodt and Princen concentrate on the object of scholar analysis; 
they deplore both a separation by pillars and the prevalence of the 
second pillar (in particular literature focusing on institutionalisation 
of CFSP, corresponding to the first group mentioned by Franck Pe-
titeville). Following the interpretation by Knodt and Princen, the in-
stitutional partition of the Union in pillars, set up by the Maastricht 
Treaty, resulted in a similar partition in the literature. 
This gap is reduced by the literature analyzing the ENP as an “over-
arching” or a “cross-pillar” policy, in particular the papers by Dov 
Lynch (2004), Marise Cremona and Christophe Hillion (2006), Elsa 
Tulmets (2006). For Elsa Tulmets (2006), the umbrella dimension 
of the ENP results from the use of the open method of coordination 
(OMC),  which  was  first  transferred  from  internal  policies  to  the 
enlargement process and then from enlargement to the neighbour-
hood policy. Indeed, the OMC favours flexibility and linkages be-
tween the various instruments used under the ENP. Cremona and 
Hillion also insist on the cross-pillar nature of the ENP. They show 
how the articulation of security, stability and prosperity in the ENP 
reflects an “attempt to integrate the pillars within the framework of 
one policy” (Cremona, Hillion 2006:20). Such attempt is also evi-
denced from policy documents, e.g. the European Security Strategy 
(2003) and the letter by Chris Patten and Javier Solana (2002): the 
joint contribution of the EC Commissioner and CFSP High Repre-
sentative  highlights  both  the  cross-pillar  nature  of  the  challenges 
facing  the  EU  and  the  need  for  ensuring  greater  consistency  be-
tween the first and second EU pillars. Several other publications 
point out the importance of security challenges in EU neighbour-
hood (Lynch 2004 a,b) and the discrepancy between those external Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  125 
challenges  and  a  growing  EU  internal  security  acquis,  (Grabbe 
2003), the central role of security objectives in the ENP (Cremona 
2004) and the use of first pillar instruments for security purposes. 
Thus, through the use of a broader theoretical framework, the re-
search led on the ENP may contribute to bridge the gap noted by 
Hill and Smith (2005: 4) in the existing literature on EU external ac-
tion, i.e. an ‘internal lenses’ focus combined with a reliance on tools 
of comparative politics. Analyzing the ENP as a cross-pillar policy 
opens  new  research  perspectives  through  bringing  back  interna-
tional relations theories in the study of EU foreign policy, as sug-
gested by Hill and Smith. 
Finally, through emphasizing both the transfer of policy modes and 
norms from the enlargement policy and the cross-pillar character of 
the ENP, the literature on ENP has also contributed to the debate on 
the EU’s distinctive nature as an international actor. This discussion 
started by François Duchêne, who called the EU a “civilian power”, 
has been further developed with the analysis of conditionality in EC 
external  policies  (De  Wilde  d’Estmaël  1998,  Petiteville  2003).  It 
has gained a new impetus since the end of the 1990’s: the European 
Security and Defence Policy’s (ESDP) developments  raised a con-
troversy among scholars  about the persistence of EU’s distinctive 
international  profile  as  a  civilian  power  (Manners  2002,  2006; 
Smith K. 2005; Sjursen 2006). The ENP, as an attempt to build “a 
coherent  over-arching  policy”  (Cremona,  Hillion  2006)  offers  a 
fruitful  ground  for  such  an  approach.  Discussions  on  the  use  of 
benchmarking and conditionality to strengthen democracy and sta-
bility  in  neighbouring  countries  (Kelley  2006,  Cremona,  Hillion 
2006, Tulmets 2006), but also analysis of the EC interventions in 
“frozen conflicts” (Popescu 2005; Helly 2007) also shed light on 
possible transformations / continuity in EU external action. 
 
 
3.  Analyzing the European Neighbourhood Policy: Building an 
Alternative Approach 
 
3.1. Explaining  European  Neighbourhood  Policy:  identifying 
analytical gaps 
 126  European Political Economy Review  
   
While the above-mentioned analyses explain in depth the ENP pol-
icy framework and origins, and, to a certain extent, contribute to a 
new inspiration in the literature on EU external action, how do they 
account  for  policy  implementation?  The  objective  here  is  not  to 
criticize the relevance of the comparison between enlargement and 
neighbourhood policies: as summarized in the previous section, the 
case for comparison is strong and the evidence convincing. How-
ever, several questions will be raised in this section to identify pos-
sible gaps left aside by the existing literature on ENP.  
To begin with, how does the European Neighbourhood Policy relate 
to previous EC policies vis-à-vis the neighbours and how do aca-
demics account for this relationship? This issue is central in ENP 
implementation, as ENP is explicitly meant to “supplement [the ex-
isting framework of relations] and build upon existing policies and 
arrangements”
7 (European Commission 2003:15). How has the EU 
managed, then, to ensure coordination between the new policy and 
the existing framework of relations? The question has been raised 
by several scholars concerning the Mediterranean countries. Raf-
faella Del Sarto, for instance, has investigated the apparent contra-
dictions between the “Wider Europe” scheme  and EU traditional 
policy towards the Southern Mediterranean countries
8. The articula-
tion between the ENP and the Euromed Partnership also lies at the 
core of Manuela Moschella’s research. Based upon a comparison 
between the two policies, she stresses the need for the ENP, as an 
“instance of regionalism”, to take into account the lessons learnt 
from a decade of Euromed partnership, among which the “impor-
tance  to  eliminate  the  asymmetrical  perception  between  the  two 
shores of the Mediterranean” (Moschella 2004). When it comes to 
Eastern European neighbours, the picture is quite different. Indeed, 
the literature has paid very little attention to EU relations with those 
countries  and  to  EC  policy  in  that  region  before  the  ENP  was 
launched. Even though a few exceptions can be mentioned in this 
respect (Cremona 2004; Cremona, Hillion 2006; Delcour 2006), no 
                                                 
7 Underlined  by  the  author.  The  Commission  also  indicates  that  “the  new 
neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework of EU relations 
with Russia and the countries of Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean 
(…)”. 
8 “’Wider Europe”, the Mediterranean, Israel and the Middle East”, presentation 
at the Workshop on Europe’s External Borders, University of Liverpool, 2003. Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  127 
publication has exclusively focused on the analysis of coordination 
modes between the ENP and EEC pre-existing policy framework in 
Western  New  Independent  States  (NIS).  Why  such  an  absence? 
This question will be explored hereafter, to check whether it reflects 
modes of articulation based upon a substitution scheme rather than a 
coordination one (i.e. the ENP being analyzed as erasing the former 
policy  framework),  or  whether  it  corresponds  to  academics’  un-
awareness or neglect of specific coordination patterns and thus can 
be considered as a shortcoming of the existing literature. In other 
words, is the enlargement focus in the ENP analysis justified by a 
tabula rasa phenomenon in EU relations with the Western NIS? Or, 
on the contrary, has the academic community overestimated the role 
of enlargement at the expenses of other factors?  
The focus on policy transfer and replication of enlargement meth-
ods in the ENP literature raises a second series of questions. While 
the literature has convincingly demonstrated the reality of such a 
transfer in policy design, what about policy implementation? How 
do the EU make its policy work? Indeed, the EU’s foreign policy 
“cannot be understood fully by examining treaty articles and formal 
institutional arrangements alone” (Smith M. 2005: 157). The hy-
pothesis developed here is that policy reception and third countries’ 
expectations matter and influence the way EU’s foreign policy work. 
When it comes to the ENP however, Eastern neighbours’ expecta-
tions have only been described by a few scholars (Goujon 2005; 
Wolczuk 2004, 2005; Kelley 2006) to underline the gap with ENP 
objectives, especially in the case of Ukraine. Policy reception and 
implementation in the field have been subject to little analysis, with 
a  few  noticeable  exceptions  (cf.  the  PhD  research  conducted  by 
Gabriella Meloni; cf. also Popescu 2006). It can be argued, however, 
that those are elements which contribute to shape the policy as well 
as EU’s influence: “To a significant extent, actorness is constructed 
through the interplay of internal political factors and the perceptions 
and expectations of outsiders.” (Bretherton, Vogel 1999:1). The key 
question  here  is  therefore:  to  what  extent  does  the  EU  shape  its 
neighbours perceptions’ and conversely, how is the ENP affected by 
the neighbours’ preferences?  
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3.2. Ideas for An Alternative Approach  
 
This paper argues that the ENP can also be understood through us-
ing other “conceptual lenses” (Cram 1997). Thus, it will propose an 
alternative approach. The analysis presented hereafter will mainly 
focus on the issues of policy reception and outputs. The key ques-
tions here are the following: what does the ENP produce (Smith K. 
2003: 3)? And, additionally: Does policy reception matter? To what 
extent do policy beneficiaries shape its outputs? These questions are 
closely interconnected if one follows the hypothesis that perceptions 
and actions of policy recipients also influence policy implementa-
tion and outputs. 
To assess the outputs of the Neighbourhood Policy, the analysis will 
build upon a comparative approach. It will compare the EU’s policy 
and relations with Ukraine, a country benefiting from the ENP, to 
those with Russia, that has decided not to take part into the policy. 
Such  a  comparison,  which  at  first  glance  may  seem  surprising 
nowadays to the majority of analysts of the EU-Ukraine and EU-
Russia relations
9, is based upon several key assumptions.  
First, strong similarities in EU policy towards those countries after 
the collapse of the USSR and a close starting point in the relation-
ship with the EU before the ENP was launched. The EU had set up 
a comparable policy framework in all former Soviet Republics, con-
sisting of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) – signed 
in 1994 both for Ukraine and for Russia
10 - and technical assistance 
under  the  TACIS  programme  (Technical  Assistance  to  the  Com-
monwealth  of  Independent  States).  The  PCA  proposed  a  similar 
structure to all partners, including provisions to foster political dia-
logue,  economic  liberalization  and  to  a  certain  extent  legal  ap-
proximation with EC acquis
11; it also provided for the same institu-
tional framework. Thus, in line with its traditional preferences to 
                                                 
9 Such comparison, however, was briefly sketched by Marise Cremona and Chris-
tophe Hillion in a recent paper (2006), as part of their analysis of ENP weak-
nesses. Based upon that comparison, they highlight the inherent tension between 
joint ownership and conditionality in the ENP. 
10 The PCA came into force on December 1st, 1997 in Russia and on March 1st, 
1998 in Ukraine.
 
11 Cf. Article 55 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed with the 
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operate at a regional level (Smith K. 2003), the EU designed a sin-
gle policy pattern for the former Soviet Republics. However, this 
was coupled with elements of differentiation both in policy objec-
tives and instruments. But here again, similarities between Ukraine 
and Russia should be stressed. Differentiation can rather be found 
between Ukraine and Russia, on the one side, and other former So-
viet Republics, on the other side. For instance, PCA signed with 
both countries included the possibility to set up a free trade area, 
which was not the case for other CIS countries. Both Ukraine and 
Russia have been the subjects of EU Common Strategies in 1999, a 
new CFSP tool (created by the Amsterdam Treaty) which was not 
used for any other country in the region. Ukraine and Russia were 
also the main beneficiaries of TACIS: Their shares in the total pro-
grammes disbursements exceeded by far those of any other former 
Soviet Republics. It is also worth stressing that both countries faced 
similar difficulties in their relations with the EU, including in par-
ticular  disputes  on  quotas  and  agreements  for  sensitive  products 
such as steel, and more important, on the status granted by the EU 
to their economies. It should not be concluded from the above that 
the EU developed exactly the same policy in Ukraine and in Russia. 
The point here is rather to highlight a similar logic and a compara-
ble level of relations.  
The second assumption underlying the approach developed here is 
that the European Neighbourhood Policy is meant to bring a change 
in EU’s relations with its neighbours and to have an added value for 
policy  partners.  Thus,  the  hypothesis  here  is  that  Ukraine’s  and 
Russia’s relations with the EU should take a different path starting 
from ENP’s creation, since the latter does not formally take part in 
the  policy  while  the  former  is  considered  as  a  “priority  partner 
country”
12 under  the  ENP.  Moreover,  domestic  policy  develop-
ments in both countries, including the Orange Revolution, could be 
interpreted as reinforcing the hypothesis of divergence. Thus, com-
paring outputs and policy patterns for a country benefiting from the 
ENP - Ukraine – and for a country used as “groupe témoin” or pla-
cebo - Russia – should allow to draw lessons on the ENP’s added 
value. Such comparison is traditionally used in evaluating public 
policies.  
                                                 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ukraine  130  European Political Economy Review  
   
However,  the  methodological  ambition  here  is  not  to  provide  a 
fully-fledged evaluation of the ENP. Such evaluation would neces-
sarily be incomplete or biased for several reasons. First, the ENP is 
still a policy in the making, with the seven first Actions Plans being 
finalized early 2005
13 and still a few plans not finalized, a strategy 
being  refined  by  the  Commission  in  December  2006  (European 
Commission  2006)  and  a  financial  instrument,  the  European 
Neighbourhood  and  Partnership  Instrument  (ENPI),  just  coming 
into force in January 2007, concomitantly to the new EU financial 
perspectives. Second, as perfectly summarized by Michael Emerson, 
Russia was left “half in and half out” of the Wider Europe Initiative 
which has led to the creation of the ENP (Emerson 2004: 9). This 
unique status has not noticeably changed ever since, as explained 
hereafter.  Its  ambiguity  makes  it  impossible  to  consider  Russia 
merely as a placebo or witness group in assessing the policy out-
comes.  
 
This  paper  should  thus be  read  as  an  alternative  and  explorative 
analysis grid to understand the ENP, not as an evaluation. Rather 
than providing answers, it has the  ambition to raise questions to 
shed a different light on a policy which has been almost exclusively 
studied from the point of view of policy decision / formulation. 
 
 
4. “In” and “Out”: What Does it Change? 
Public policies can very roughly  be defined as a set of public inter-
ventions/actions designed by the government/public authorities to 
tackle a problem. In other words, a public policy reflects the “ca-
pacity  of  public  systems  to  manage  public  problems”  (Thoenig 
2006). Since policies are supposed to have effects on those prob-
lems, change is therefore the key variable.  
To identify the changes induced by the ENP, this paper will focus 
on three levels of analysis: 
￿ Discourse on EU-Ukrainian and EU-Russian relations; 
￿ Policy  objectives  in  EU-Ukrainian  and  EU-Russian  rela-
tions; 
                                                 
13 With Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and 
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￿ Policy implementation, tools and methods. 
 
4.1 A Discourse based upon differentiation 
 
Discourse  analysis
14 highlights  an  increasing  divergence  between 
Ukraine  and  Russia  in  the  perception  of  their  relations  with  the 
European Union, based upon a redefinition of their interests. 
 
Ukrainian discourse: participation in the ENP as a first step to-
wards accession ? 
 
Since the end of 1990’s, Ukrainian authorities have been emphasiz-
ing the European orientation of Ukraine’s foreign policy and ex-
pressing their wish to join the EU. Ukraine officially declared in 
1998  EU  membership  as  a  strategic  goal
15.  The  EU  integration 
choice has been reinforced after Yushchenko’s election at the end of 
2004 and it has not been questioned following March 2006 elections, 
which have brought back to power Viktor Yanukovich. According 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the European integration is a 
key and irreversible priority of Ukraine's foreign policy”
 16. 
 
How does the Neighbourhood Policy fit in this discourse? Both in-
terviews held in Kyiv and discourse analysis highlight a strong dis-
appointment  vis-à-vis  the  ENP  and  its  being  dissociated  from  a 
membership perspective, which confirm the conclusions drawn by 
other scholars (Wolczuk 2005; Batory Foundation 2006; Cremona, 
Hillion  2006;  Kelley  2006;  Kratchovíl  2006;  Petrov  2006).  Dis-
course  on  the  ENP,  however,  has  changed  over  time  to  become 
harsher.  The  ENP  was  first  criticized  as  reflecting  a  lack  of  EU 
                                                 
14 This section will build upon a review of Ukrainian, Russian and EU discourse 
including: foreign policy documents and speeches (e.g. Presidents’/Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs’ speeches), interviews. Those correspond to a preliminary explo-
ration ; I intend to conduct additional research in the field within the next months 
to refine the results. 
15 As  analyzed  by  Katarina  Wolczuk,  such  orientation  is  based  upon  a  large 
agreement  among  political  elites  with  the  European  choice,  while  the  overall 
positive attitude of the Ukrainian population vis-à-vis EU accession conceals both 
a weak level of information on the EU and strong regional differences (Wolczuk 
2004). 
16 Cf. www.mfa.gov.ua  132  European Political Economy Review  
   
strategy towards Ukraine
17 and a move backwards when compared 
to the Polish propositions of the early 2000’s, in particular the Non 
Paper  drafted  by  the  Polish  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  A  con-
nected interpretation was that the ENP could only be a first step or a 
“temporary mechanism”
18 for Ukraine on the road to EU member-
ship. The gap between Ukrainian expectations and EU action grew 
following  the  Orange  Revolution,  which  consecrated  Ukraine’s 
European aspirations but did not lead to a major change in EU pol-
icy (Wolczuk 2005; Petrov 2006). In particular, the Neighbourhood 
Action Plan, prepared and negotiated under the former administra-
tion, was not perceived as bringing an adequate answer neither to 
Ukraine’s longstanding European choice
19, nor to those newly ex-
pressed aspirations. Two months after his election, President Yu-
shchenko stressed that “European integration is the only path open 




The  maturation  of  the  Neighbourhood  Policy,  with  other  Action 
Plans  being  signed  with  Caucasus  or  Mediterranean  countries, 
pushed  Ukrainian  authorities  to  “require  further  differentiation” 
(Cremona, Hillion 2006: 34). This is reflected in the call for an en-
hanced agreement
21, thanks to which Ukraine could again be at the 
forefront  of  the  Neighbourhood  Policy.  However,  whatever  the 
benefits of such agreement may be, the objective in the long run 
remains EU accession: 
 
“We do not accept any substitute for European integration policy like 
one proposed by the concept of European neighbourhood policy (…). 
We do not see any need in our further participation in the ENP, which 
                                                 
17 This was in particular the position expressed by Boris Tarasyuk, then Chairman 
of the European Affairs Committee at the Verkhovna Rada. Intervention at the 
conference “EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy”, Stefan Batory Founda-
tion, Warsaw 2003. 
18 Interview  with  a  Ukrainian  civil  servant,  Anti-monopoly  Committee,  Kyiv, 
March 2006. 
19 “[The Action Plan] does not comply with [our] vision of the future of [bilateral] 
relations". Statement of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry on 14 December 2004, 
www.mfa.gov.ua.  
20 Discourse before the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 23 February 2005. 
21 The official negotiations between Ukraine and the EU for an enhanced agree-
ment started on 5
th March 2007. Cf. European Commission, IP/07/275. Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  133 




Russian  discourse:  towards  a  new  assertiveness  in  the  relations 
with the EU 
 
Russian authorities’ discourse on the relations with the EU reflect 
the fundamental importance granted to the Union under Vladimir 
Putin’s  Presidency.  In  the  hierarchy  of  external  priorities  set  by 
President Putin upon his accession to Presidency in 2000 (Concep-
tion of Foreign Policy 2000), the EU ranks second after CIS coun-
tries. Such importance is also attested in political nominations, in 
particular two appointments in 2004, i.e. one year after the launch-
ing of the four EU-Russia Common Spaces. Mikhaïl Fradkov, ap-
pointed Prime Minister in March 2004, was formerly the Russian 
Representative to the European Communities in Brussels
23; a few 
weeks following his designation, the Russian President appointed a 
special advisor for the development of relations between Russia and 
the European Union, Sergey Yastrjembsky. Both nominations are 
clear evidence of the articulation between domestic politics and pri-
orities enshrined in Russian external agenda. 
 
The discourse on relations to be developed with the EU reflects a 
strong perception of Russia’s specificity as an international actor. 
This  claim  for  uniqueness  motivated  the  rejection  of  the 
Neighbourhood Policy, which was interpreted as neglecting or even 
as denying Russian global character (Delcour 2006). The principle 
of differentiation underlying the ENP, which could have been con-
sidered as a means to take Russian’s specificity into account, was 
analyzed as a lack of clear priorities among neighbours (Arbatova 
2004). Such an interpretation led Russian authorities to urge the EU 
develop a tailor-made relationship, which gave rise to the “Strategic 
partnership” launched in Saint-Petersburg in 2003.  
 
                                                 
22 Speech of Roman Shpek, Ambassador of Ukraine to the EU, EU-Ukraine Par-
liamentary Cooperation Committee. Strasbourg, 15 February 2007. 
23 Interestingly, Fradkov was appointed Representative to the European Commu-
nities  in  2003,  when  Russia  and  the  EU  decided  to  develop  their  partnership 
through creating four Common Spaces. 134  European Political Economy Review  
   
Stemming from the perception of Russia’s international nature, two 
key elements can be identified in Russian discourse on the relation-
ship with the EU. First, the demand for an equal partnership with 
the EU, which is linked to Russia’s evolution and to its forthcoming 
accession  to  the  WTO.  For  Russia,  this  requires  a  new  type  of 
agreement replacing the PCA, which is due to expire at the end of 
the year: 
 
“An automatic prolongation is not our preferred variant. The PCA is al-
ready partly outdated. It was signed in 1994 at a time when both Russia 
and the EU were different, and in 2007 new changes will occur. For in-
stance, we expect the Russian Federation to become a full right WTO 
member. And if you carefully examine the text of the PCA, approxi-
mately one third relates to issues sorted out by accession to WTO”
24. 
 
Second, the demand for a wide-ranging partnership taking also into 
account the EU’s evolution, i.e. 2004 and 2007 enlargements and 
the  developments of the ESDP since 1999
25: 
 
“The European Union is changing, it is enlarging and acquiring new 





This expanding security dimension coincides with the Russian vi-
sion of a multi-polar world
27 recently re-asserted by Vladimir Putin 
at the Munich Security Conference
28, and it is therefore perceived 
as positive. It calls for developing joint actions and cooperation on 
international issues, e.g. in the framework of the Quartet when it 
comes to the Near East conflict or on Iranian nuclear threat. Finally, 
                                                 
24 Interview  of  Vladimir  Chizhov,  Permanent  Representative  of  Russia  to  the 
European Communities in Brussels, to Russian accredited journalists, 13 Septem-
ber 2005 (translated from Russian by the author). 
25  In 2000, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly stressed the need 
for  defining  a  position  vis-à-vis  the  EU’s  expanding  military  capabilities.  Cf. 
“Mid-term Strategy Towards the European Union 2000-2010”, www.mid.ru 
26 Interview with Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of Russia to the 
European Communities in Brussels. Published in Vremya Novostei Daily, July 26, 
2005. 
27 “The European Union today is  not only a free trade area between Member 
States. It is also an important political factor and to a great extent one of the poles 
of influence in the contemporary multipolary world”. Interview given by Vladi-
mir Chizhov, 13 September 2005, op.cit.  
28 Cf. Vedomosti, 12 February 2007. Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  135 
progress  in  ESDP  justifies  the  all-encompassing  vision  of  EU-
Russian partnership favoured by Russia and corresponding to the 
global nature of both parties. 
 
This cooperation on international issues, however, is tightly con-
nected  to  another  and  less  visible  dimension  of  the  Russian  dis-
course: EU-Russian cooperation in their common neighbourhood. 
Russian authorities aim at defending Russian interests in the CIS 
countries/former Soviet Republics, including in EU new Member 
States
29, while at the same time minimizing differences arising in 
this region with the EU as a whole. To that purpose, EU action in 
the neighbourhood is referred to as one of the numerous themes be-
ing discussed in the framework of EU-Russian cooperation, and not 
as a  core issue. The fact that Russian authorities do not directly 
mention the ENP, or that they consider neighbourhood as a vague 
concept  not  precisely  defined
30,  reflects  their  willingness  not  to 
grant the policy too much importance: 
 
“Our colleagues have a different understanding of priorities [NB differ-
ent from a strict geographical definition of neighbourhood]. Their un-
derstanding mainly includes European countries of the CIS. As stressed 




Interestingly, Russian discourse reflects a vision of EU-Russian re-
lations as still being under construction, in spite of the new frame-
work being designed in 2003
32. Russian authorities consider what 
                                                 
29 In particular, the Baltic States are considered by Russia as an area of multiple 
tensions, including obstacles to citizenship for Russian minorities in Latvia and 
Estonia, border issues and more recently tensions around the Soviet memorial in 
Estonia.   
30 “One  of  the  [international  issues]  discussed  in  the  framework  of  the  EU-
Russian political dialogue is what our EU partners like to call the region of com-
mon neighbourhood. This is not a strict geographical term. If only this criterion 
was taken into account, the first issue to be discussed would be Norway, in so far 
as it is a common neighbour”. Interview given by Vladimir Chizhov, 13 Septem-
ber 2005. 
31 Ibidem. 
32  “Roadmaps are not the end of our work, but rather the beginning of a new 
step” Interview given by Vladimir Chizhov, 13/09/2005, op.cit.  136  European Political Economy Review  
   
they call the “2007 factor”
33 as an important step in EU-Russia rela-
tions, much more than the ENP developments.  
 
An increasing differentiation in EU discourse among policy partici-
pants and a growing split between “insiders” and “outsiders”  
 
It is argued here that EU discourse on relations with Ukraine and 
Russia has followed the two countries’ increasingly diverging per-
ceptions. While differentiation between them
34 was very weak in 
EU draft documents on Wider Europe, it has significantly strength-
ened over time. EU discourse can thus be characterized as reactive 
and pragmatic. 
 
Defining and naming the neighbours was a key concern of the joint 
letter published by Chris Patten and Javier Solana in August 2002, 
which can be considered as the first policy document on the Wider 
Europe issue. Ukraine was pointed out as a country whose aspira-
tions and declared willingness to join the EU should clearly be ad-
dressed in the new policy
35. With respect to Russia, the authors un-
derlined  its  specificity,  but  also  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with  it. 
Even  though  they  recognised  “clear  arguments  “  to  differentiate 
Russia from other future neighbours, based, among others, upon its 
lack  of  accession’s  willingness,  they  also  acknowledged  the  key 
role played by Russia in the region and its being “indivisible” from 
the other three countries targeted by the future policy. Interestingly, 
the first Commission proposal – the Wider Europe initiative pre-
sented in March 2003 – did not sketch any distinction between Rus-
                                                 
33 “Vstrecha na vyshem urovne Rossija- Evropeiskij Sojuz, Helsinki 24/11/2006”, 
28/11/2006, www.mid.ru. (High-level meeting  Russia-European Union, Helsinki, 
28/11/2006, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
34 The  evolution  of  this  concept  in  EU  discourse  should  be  noted:  in  the  EC 
“Wider Europe” communication (European Commission 2003), the basis for dif-
ferentiation is a different starting point among neighbours in the relation with the 
EU. The concept is further explained in the 2004 EC Strategy Paper, which gives 
a broader definition including also geographical location, political and economic 
situations, reform programmes, and, interestingly, perceived interests in the con-
text of the ENP (European Commission 2004).  
35 “Our future eastern neighbours fall somewhat uncomfortably in-between. Mak-
ing  their  situation  less  ambivalent  and  more  comfortable  –  particularly  for 
Ukraine (…)- is probably the most immediate challenge for our neighbourhood 
policy” (Patten and Solana, 2002) Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  137 
sia and Ukraine: Russia was still included in the policy (European 
Commission 2003).  
 
The shift in EU discourse and differentiation among “Western NIS” 
was first induced by Russian authorities’ refusal to be included in 
the  neighbourhood  policy.  According  to  interviews  held  at  DG 
Relex, Russia’s very negative reaction to the EC proposal of being 
part  of  the  ENP  compelled  the  Commission  to  develop  an  un-
planned
36 individual  approach  for  Russia
37.  The  articulation  be-
tween the specific approach requested by Russia and the ENP then 
became a key issue for the EU
38.  
 
As for Ukraine, the first reactions expressing disappointment and 
frustrations not to be offered a membership prospect did not led the 
EU to propose a kind of enhanced status to Ukraine in the frame-
work of the ENP
39. The EU’s immediate reactions following No-
vember  2004  elections  and  subsequent  demonstrations  remained 
cautious too
 (Wolczuk 2005). While welcoming the democratic ori-
entations of the new Ukrainian President, they gave a limited an-
swer to his European aspirations, with the exception of the Euro-
pean Parliament
40. The underlying idea was to reinforce Ukraine’s 
participation in the ENP rather than to propose an alternative: as 
mentioned in several interviews held at DG Relex, “ENP incentives 
are clearly sufficient for Ukraine”
41. Clear assertion of the preva-
                                                 
36 “From our perspective, our most important neighbour’s place in our neighbour-
hood policy is self-evident” (Verheugen, 2003). 
37 Interview DG Relex, Brussels, March 2005. 
38 It first developed a scheme of flexible interaction, based upon the need for co-
herence (European Commission 2004).  However, tensions with Russia on politi-
cal evolutions in western NIS and “frozen conflicts” were instrumental in  the 
EU’s building a new scheme based upon dissociation between the strategic part-
nership developed with Russia and the ENP, and cooperation with Russia for pre-
venting conflicts and enhancing stability in common neighbourhood (e.g. Black 
Sea) (European Commission 2006). 
39 In particular, the Strategy Paper did not refer to Ukrainian expectations nor to 
any possible forward-leaning role for Ukraine (European Commission 2004). 
40 Resolution voted on 13 February 2005, Official Journal C 247 E, 6/10/2005. 
The Parliament called EU leaders to give Ukraine “a membership perspective”. In 
January 2006, the Parliament voted a resolution in which it reiterated its call and 
asked the recognition of a “European perspective in the long-term”. Report on the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, rapporteur Charles Tannock, A6-0399/2005. 
41 Interviews, DG Relex, Brussels, March 2005.  138  European Political Economy Review  
   
lence given to the ENP framework is also linked to the reflection 
developed within EU institutions throughout 2006 on enlargement 
strategy. Whereas they do not preclude membership over the longer 
term, the European Council conclusions stress the need for ensuring 
also the deepening of EU integration and taking into account the 
capacity of the Union to absorb new members (European Council 
2006). 
 
4.2. Policy objectives, tools and processes 
 
Whereas the analysis of EU, Ukrainian and Russian discourses high-
lights a strong differentiation based upon participation in the ENP 
framework, it can be argued that the EU policy patterns in the two 
countries are far from dissimilar when it comes to policy objectives 
and tools. However, further analysis indicates that policy tools are 
used differently by Ukraine and Russia, thus suggesting two distinct 
modes of appropriation.  
 
4.2.1. Policy objectives: different labels, same content? 
 
The comparison of key policy objectives and achievements in the re-
lationship with the EU shows a continuing coincidence between Rus-
sia and Ukraine over the last four years, albeit under different names. 
This  coincidence  can  be  identified  in  several  main  policy  areas, 
among which economic cooperation and cooperation in the field of 
justice and home affairs. 
 
1. Economic cooperation 
 
Over the last four years, Russia and Ukraine have apparently been 
following different paths in their economic cooperation with the EU. 
Whereas the objectives of cooperation with Ukraine are embedded 
in the framework of the ENP and thus defined by the Action Plan 
signed  in  2005,  Russia  and  the  EU  have  decided  at  the  Saint-
Petersburg summit in May 2003 to launch a Common Economic 
Space, the roadmap of which is part of the package agreed in Mos-
cow in 2005 (EU-Russia Roadmaps 2005). Both documents, how-
ever, use a similar wording to describe the relationship with the EU. 
The Roadmap for the EU-Russia common economic space indicates 
that “the overall objective of the CES is the creation of an open and Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  139 
integrated market between the EU and Russia”. The Action Plan 
signed with Ukraine mentions “the perspective of moving beyond 
cooperation to a significant degree of integration, including through 
a stake in the EU’s Internal Market”. Thus, in both cases the pur-
pose is similar: to reach integration through fostering reforms for 
promoting an open and transparent economy and eventually build-
ing a free-trade area. Both documents also mention the same in-
struments:  approximation  of  relevant  legislation  and  institutional 
capacity-building. 
 How  can  similarity  in  the  economic  cooperation’s  objectives  be 
explained? It can be argued that it corresponds to the logical exten-
sion  of  the  objectives  defined  under  the  PCA  framework  in  the 
1990’s. Two elements play a key role here. First, over the last dec-
ade Ukraine and Russia have been facing roughly the same chal-
lenges in the promotion of reforms and in their external economic 
relations. For instance, both countries have been struggling for the 
acknowledgement of their market economy status at the end of the 
1990’s/early 2000’s
42. Their integration into the world economy has 
been hampered by similar problems, e.g. the lack of transparency 
and regulatory complexity. Secondly, even though the agreements 
expire in 2007 for Russia and 2008 for Ukraine, PCA provisions 
have not been fully implemented in both cases; both the Roadmaps 
and the Action Plan call for ensuring an effective implementation of 
PCA provisions, in particular in the areas of trade, administrative 
and  macro-economic  reforms.  Therefore,  even  though  policy 
framework for relations with the EU diverges, elements of continu-
ity prevail and the current policy achievements are still rooted in the 
long-standing objectives mentioned in the PCAs.  
 
2. Freedom, Security and Justice 
 
The analysis of the cooperation developed in the field of justice and 
home  affairs  (now  called  “freedom,  security  and  justice”)  also 
shows that it largely builds upon previous agreements and tools. For 
instance, EU-Russia Action Plan on Combating Organised Crime
43, 
                                                 
42This status was granted by the EU to Russia in November 2002 and to Ukraine 
in December 2005. 
43 European Union Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian Federation in 
Combating Organized Crime, Official Journal C 106, 13/04/2000 140  European Political Economy Review  
   
signed in April 2000, remains a pillar of current EU-Russia coop-
eration in the field of Justice and Home Affairs
44. EU-Ukraine co-
operation in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy is 
based on the 2001 Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs
45. Like 
economic cooperation, the objectives and key issues of JHA coop-
eration with the EU are similar for Ukraine and Russia: migration 
and border management, money laundering, trafficking in human 
beings, drugs and corruption
46. While migration and border man-
agement issues are addressed through cooperation with Frontex
47 in 
both cases, over the last few years the key element both for Ukraine 
and for Russia has been the negotiation of a visa facilitation agree-
ment. This has been linked by the EU to the negotiations on a read-
mission agreement
48. Beyond policy tools and current achievements, 
it should be stressed that the long-term perspective (establishing a 
mutual  visa-free  travel  regime  with  the  EU
49)  is  the  same  for 
Ukraine and Russia.  
 
Thus, this brief overview of policy objectives and achievements in 
two key sectors show that the ENP has not generated any major rup-
ture, neither temporal (the priorities for cooperation were often de-
fined before the ENP was launched) nor geographical (the priorities 
for cooperation are roughly the same for Ukraine and  for Russia, 
mainly because challenges are similar).  
 
4.2.2. Policy tools: Same content, different use? 
 
Policy tools used in the relationship with the EU are also, at least 
partially, similar: the institutional framework and assistance tools do 
                                                 
44 Cf. Roadmap for the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, May 
2005. 
45 European Union Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs in Ukraine, 10 De-
cember 2001, Official Journal C 077, 29/03/2003. 
46 EU-Ukraine JHA Ministerial meeting, November 2002. 
47 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the Ex-
ternal Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 
48 The agreements were signed at the EU-Russia Summit on 25 May 2006 in So-
chi and at the EU-Ukraine Summit on 27 October 2006 in Helsinki. 
49 Cf. EU-Russia Summit, Joint Statement, May 2003; Roadmap for the Common 
Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, May 2005; Joint Statement, Permanent 
Partnership Council on Freedom, Security and Justice, 30 October 2006. Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  141 
not formally differ for Ukraine and for Russia, highlighting elements 




As indicated above, the EU designed in the 1990’s a new pattern of 
agreements encompassing all the former Soviet Republics. Thus, the 
institutional framework is still similar since the ENP builds on exist-
ing policies and arrangements. 
 
Against  this  background,  negotiations  for  a  new  agreement  with 
Ukraine and with Russia should be considered as a test for the ENP. 
In particular, will the policy generate a new model of relations to be 
enshrined in an unprecedented type of agreement? ENP’scapacity of 
innovation could thus be checked against the degree of divergence 
between the two future agreement. Whereas the status of negotiations 
is more advancedin the case of Ukraine
50, draft negotiation directives 
and EU discourse, as shown in the two paragraphs below, highlight 
strong similarities in the scope of agreements, with an emphasis on 
the broader nature of EU-Russia partnership:  
 
“The Agreement [with Ukraine] aims to deepen political co-operation 
on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, to establish a deep and 
comprehensive free trade area, increase energy security, and strengthen 
co-operation on key areas such as justice, freedom and security, envi-
ronment, transport and people-to-people exchanges” (European Com-
mission 2007). 
 
“The Commission wants the new agreement [with Russia] to be based 
on recognition of common values such as democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law. The Commission hopes the agreement will adopt ambi-
tious objectives on political and external security cooperation, effective 
multilateralism, provisions on the fight against organised crime, WMDs, 
migration and asylum, and counter-terrorism. In particular, the Com-
mission wants to consolidate the EU-Russia energy relationship based 
on reciprocity, fair and equal access and a level playing field, and to 
                                                 
50 Throughout  autumn  2006, Poland  blocked  the  opening  of  negotiations  with 
Russia due to Russian embargo on Polish meat. At the end of February 2007, 
Lithuania has threatened to do the same following the closure by Transneft (Rus-
sia's state-controlled pipeline operator) of the Druzhba link to Mazeikiu Nafta (a 
Lithuanian refinery) after a leak last summer. Cf. Kommersant, 24 February 2007. 142  European Political Economy Review  
   
promote further development of EU-Russia trade relations” (European 
Commission 2006b). 
 
The hypothesis here – to be tested against further progress in the 
negotiations – is that the EC has not yet designed the new type of 
agreement promised to its neighbours. Whereas it has sketched the 
broad outlines of an enhanced agreement, the content will be deter-
mined by political bargaining within the EU and with partners dur-
ing negotiations




Even though it is not part of the ENP, Russia is included in the assis-
tance framework designed for the neighbourhood policy. It was of-
fered ENPI support to implement parts of the strategic partnership 
linked  to  the  ENP.  This  offer  has  important  policy  consequences. 
First, benefiting from ENPI entails participating in cross border co-
operation projects. Such participation gives evidence of continuity
52 
(Delcour, 2002). Its inclusion in cross-border projects under ENPI 
can also be analyzed as an expression of EU search for regional co-
herence, already noted in the Patten/Solana letter. The use of TAIEX 
and Twinning to provide assistance not only to ENP beneficiaries, 
but also to Russia
53 deserves a specific attention. TAIEX and Twin-
nings have widely been pointed out as the main assistance tools for 
pre-accession. Their replication in the neighbourhood policy is also 
one of the key arguments to analyse the ENP in the light of enlarge-
ment policy and to point out similarities of methods (Kelley 2006; 
Tulmets 2006; Cremona, Hillion 2006). How should the extension of 
TAIEX/Twinning to a non-candidate and a non-ENP country such as 
Russia be analysed? Whereas this extension necessarily weakens the 
offer made to ENP partners (since other countries are proposed simi-
                                                 
51 Evolution in the EU discourse in the second half of 2006 shows that the content 
of future agreements is tightly linked to political developments, as shown by the 
greater emphasis on the need for a genuinely co-operative partnership with Russia 
in the field of energy (Council of the European Union 2006).  
52 Following Finland’s accession to the EU in 1995 the third Tacis regulation 
(n°1279/96) introduced cross-border cooperation in EU assistance to the former 
USSR and Russia was the first non-candidate country to benefit from that instru-
ment in the 1990’s. 
53 Cf. http://taiex.cec.eu.int/  Delcour: Does the ENP Make a Difference?  143 
lar tools), it also reflects a de-contextualization of instruments which 
were specifically designed for EU accession (since Russia has no in-
tention  to  join  the  EU).  It  can  be  argued  that  such  de-
contextualisation is not the desired effect of a public choice, but can 
be better explained through path dependence. Indeed, some of the 
tools mentioned above were introduced in the former USSR by the 
EC before the ENP was launched, first in Russia through a mecha-
nism  called  IBPP  (Institution  Building  Partnership  Programme), 
which shared features of the Twinning exercise (Delcour 2003)
54. 
The specific experience accumulated under IBPP in Russia was use-
ful in developing Twinnings in the former Soviet Union; they were 
first introduced in the Russian Federation in 2005 before being ex-
tended to Ukraine and to other CIS countries
55. Thus, the costs of de-
signing a specific instrument for Russia would have been higher than 
those of transition from IBPP to Twinnings.  
 
The above-mentioned similarities in the instruments and institutional 
framework used by the EU in its relationship with Ukraine and Rus-
sia reflect the persistence of pre-ENP elements. The EC justifies such 
legacies with the need to ensure policy coherence in the region while 
promoting a pragmatic approach, taking into account political and 
economic  developments  (European  Commission  2003;  Verheugen 
2003). However, several elements limit this rationalist interpretation, 
among  which  the  discrepancy  with  the  neighbours’  expectations. 
Therefore, persistence of pre-ENP elements and similarities between 
policies  vis-à-vis  Ukraine  and  Russia  may  be  better  explained 
through the EU’s tendency ‘to reproduce itself’ in its relations with 
non-members (Bretherton, Vogler 1999: 249) and its failure to invent 
new policy patterns tailor-made to partners’ needs.  
 
4.2.3. Policy appropriation : Two modes of adaptation  
 
However, concluding that EC policy in the NIS is systematically rep-
licated would partially be misleading in so far as it would neglect any 
possibility for EU partners to adapt the policy. Analysis of policy 
implementation shows the existence of mechanisms of appropriation 
                                                 
54 Interview at the EC Delegation to the Russian Federation, Moscow, June 2003. 
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in the field, both in Ukraine and in Russia, thus highlighting two 
modes of policy adaptation.  
 
Russia and the EU: selective adaptation  
 
Russia’s insistence on developing an equal partnership with the EU 
has resulted in a number of policy adaptations. First, the principle of 
partners’  equality  has  framed  policy  formulation  and  it  has  been 
embedded in all policy documents. For instance, the Roadmap for 
the Common Space for freedom, security and justice mentions as 
the  first  overarching  principle  underlying  EU-Russia  cooperation 
“equality between partners and mutual respect  of interests” (EU-
Russian Roadmaps 2005), before the “adherence to common values, 
notably to democracy and the rule of law”. Cremona and Hillion 
(2006) also note that “the conceptualisation of the Common Eco-
nomic Space was the task of an EU-Russia High Level Group con-
sisting of an equal number of Russian and EU representatives, rather 
than the exclusive job of the Commission and the Council services”.  
This recognition of equality as an overarching policy principle is 
translated into policy mechanisms. Russia has expressed its prefer-
ence for flexible and concrete forms of dialogue with the EU. This 
preference is not new and can be traced back to the shift in EU-
Russia relations at the end of the 1990’s-early 2000’s, reflecting a 
new Russian assertiveness
56 (Shemiatenkov 2002) which developed 
well before Vladimir Putin’s Presidency and resulted in the promo-
tion of a dialogue-driven approach (Delcour 2002). Concrete exam-
ples  of  such  dialogue  are  for  instance  the  Round  Table  of  EU-
Russia Industrialists launched at the end of the 1990’s, or the EU-
Russia energy dialogue. 
 
While fostering joint ownership, Russia’s  approach is also based 
upon  a  selective  adaptation  in  the  socialization  process. 
Socialization can be very roughly defined as the process by which 
actors  learn  to  adopt  the  behaviour  pattern  of  the  community  in 
which they live. Two elements should be mentioned in the case of 
Russia. First, the socialization process, as mentioned above, started 
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in the 1990’s with learning mechanisms in the Tacis programme 
(including cross-cooperation projects) and consultation / dialogue 
mechanisms  in  the  framework  of  the  PCA  and  of  the  Northern 
Dimension. Second, the new policy framework – Russia’s rejection 
of ENP and the development of a specific strategic partnership – 
has de facto strengthened the role of socialization at the expenses of 
conditionality. Political conditionality has always been part of the 
PCA and of the Tacis regulations and it is now included in the ENPI 
regulations. However, the EU has used negative conditionality only 
twice with Russia (in 1995 and 2000, cf. Delcour 2002), without 
producing any effect. Positive conditionality is also unlikely to exert 
a  great  pressure  on  Russia  for  several  reasons,  among  which 
Russia’s size, its multi-vector foreign policy and the little weight of 
European aid in Russian budget.  
 
While conditionality is unlikely to produce results in the case of 
Russia,  socialization  can  only  be  “voluntary”  –  in  Kratchovíl’s 
words (Kratchovíl 2006: 13). The tough negotiations for the content 
of EU-Russia roadmaps, especially those on the common economic 
space and justice and home affairs, highlight Russia’s attempts to 
shape the content and tools of cooperation according to its areas of 
interests.  Legal  approximation  to  EU  laws  is  not  a  fully-fledged 
process, but a selective one used by Russia for fulfilling its own 
policy interests. Approximation is limited either in depth (i.e. the 
degree  of  approximation,  cf.  Meloni  2007)  or  in  width  (i.e.  to 
selected  policy  areas).  It  is  primarily  targeted  at  the  adoption  of 
rules  and  standards  for  facilitating  trade  relations  and  improving 
Russia’s integration to the world economy, thus answering Russia’s 
economic  and  especially  political  interests.  As  mentioned  by 
Shemiatenkov (2002: 9), approximation is to be seen as “a vital fac-
tor of [Russia’s] radical societal transformation”. The adaptation of 
EU laws in the field of competition, for instance, is expected to im-
prove domestic situation and at the same time is facilitated by the 
historical lack of Russian regulations in that field. 
 
Does this selective use of EU norms and tools mean that Russia can 
be considered as a free-rider of the European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy? This conclusion would imply a fully-fledged rationalist behav-
iour on the part of Russian authorities. However, a first analysis of 
policy reception indicates that while Russian policy-makers try to 146  European Political Economy Review  
   
maximize their power and benefits in their relations with the EU, 
they also adopt rules which they deem appropriate.  
 
Ukraine and ENP: accommodated conditionality 
 
While the picture is quite different for Ukraine, it can be argued 
that, to a lesser extent, the ENP is also adapted in the field to fit 
Ukrainian  interests.  The  developments  in  the  sphere  of  legal  ap-
proximation, in particular, show that Ukraine has built its own in-
terpretation  of  EU  requirements  and  has  positioned  itself  as  a 
would-be EU candidate preparing for the accession process.  
Such behaviour is illustrated by two examples.  
 
First, it is reflected in a maximalist interpretation of the acquis to be 
adopted. Legal approximation started already almost a decade ago, 
in 1998 (Petrov 2006), with the entry into force of the PCA. The 
degree of approximation foreseen in the agreement, however, was 
limited: “Ukraine shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation shall 
be gradually made compatible with that of the Community” (Article 
51 of the PCA). Furthermore, the areas in which approximation was 
required  were  mainly  those  referred  to  in  the  PCA,  i.e.  Internal 
Market-related legislation. Ukrainian authorities promoted a much 
broader understanding which also included the second and third pil-
lars of the European Union. For instance, the Ukrainian Parliament 
refers to European Union law (Verkhovna Rada 2002), thus encom-
passing the whole acquis. The Action Plan constitutes a shift, as far 
as  it  broadens  the  areas  of  approximation.  Since  its  signature, 
Ukraine has already made huge efforts and progress in further ap-
proximation under the trade area, in the light of WTO accession 
(Petrov 2006: 62) but also in complying with political requirements 
and international standards concerning democracy and the rule of 
law
57. The latter should be underlined, even more so as the concept 
of  “common  values”  mentioned  by  the  Action  Plan  is  “vague”; 
moreover, “the AP does not specify the scope of these values” (Pet-
rov 2006: 61). Such efforts from Ukrainian authorities in the politi-
cal area, with a special focus on Council of Europe norms, go be-
yond the mere “political reorientation” of the PCA sparked by the 
ENP (Cremona, Hillion 2006: 29). It can be argued that it reflects 
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an  anticipated  behaviour  from  the  Ukrainian  government,  which 
foresees further steps in EU integration and which at the same time 
gives a signal to the EU.  
 
Interestingly, the methods used for legal approximation recall those 
used under EU integration or the enlargement process. For instance, 
since 2001 a Scoreboard has been set up on Implementation of the 
EU Action Plan, in order to track progress in the implementation of 
JHA measures in Ukraine. This instrument was then replicated and 
a Scoreboard was created to monitor legal approximation. Score-
boards have widely been used either during the process of EU’s in-
ternal  integration,  e.g.  to  monitor  the  implementation  of  Internal 
Market legislation, or under the enlargement process to track the 
progress of candidate countries with the approximation of their leg-
islation to that of the EU. Here, it should be noted that Ukraine is 
the only neighbouring country to resort to such instrument, which 
also  highlights  its  distinctive  profile  among  the  neighbours.  This 
specificity is also demonstrated by the development of a legal ap-
proximation mechanism within the Ukrainian institutional system, 
involving both the executive and legislative branches of power. The 
Ministry  of  Justice  monitors  the  implementation  of  the  National 
Programme of Approximation in collaboration with the Committee 
of European Integration in the Verkhovna Rada, it provides exper-
tise of draft laws on their compliance with EU law and it ensures 
analytical, information and methodological support to the approxi-
mation  process;  in  2004,  a  State  Department  on  Legislation  Ap-
proximation  was  established  as  a  specialized  governmental  body 
subordinated to the Ministry of Justice and responsible for day-to-day 
activities in the field of legal approximation
58. Again, there is no such 
developed mechanism in other neighbouring countries. 
 
Thus, Ukraine – starting even under Kuchma’s Presidency – has 
pushed forward legal approximation, first as a means to take advan-
tage from EU enlargement
59, then to acquire a distinct profile under 
the ENP and to position itself as a pre-candidate.  
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Even though their perspective is different, the analytical framework 
developed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) can be used 
to summarize the differences between Russia and Ukraine in policy 
reception. To study EU external governance, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier focus on the transfer of EU rules, asking specifically 
how rule transfers happens and what is exported. Thus, little atten-
tion is paid to policy adaptation by third countries in the implemen-
tation  of  EU  rules.  However,  the  categories  proposed  by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier can also be used as a grid to high-
light differences in policy reception, e.g. between Ukraine and Rus-
sia. As shown above, Russia cannot be considered only as “strategic 
utility-maximizer”  (Schimmelfennig,  Sedelmeier  2004:  663);  it 
rather combines elements of the social learning and (mainly) lesson-
drawing models. The above analysis for Ukraine highlights a com-
bination of (mainly) the external incentives model, in which posi-
tive conditionality and bargaining for rewards play a key role, with 
a few elements following the logic of appropriateness which charac-





Two main conclusions can be drawn from this brief comparison of 
EU  relations  with  Ukraine  and  with  Russia.  First,  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy was neither created out of the blue (or out of 
a vague and ill-defined framework of relations) nor constituted a 
tabula rasa in EU relations with neighbours. The ENP has not only 
built upon an institutional framework designed over the last decade 
in the relations with the EU but also on habits and socialization 
elements  embedded  in  those  relations.  The  comparison  between 
Russia  and  Ukraine  shows  that  four  years  after  the  ENP  was 
launched, policy patterns do not significantly differ, in spite of dis-
cursive  differentiation.  Does  it  mean  that  the  ENP  is  much  ado 
about nothing? The comparison rather indicates the combination or 
coexistence, in the ENP, of elements transferred from enlargement 
with patterns and features specifically developed in EU-NIS rela-
tions before the ENP was launched. The relation with the EU is 
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therefore shaped by policy continuity and routine as much as by 
policy transfer from the enlargement process.  
 
The second conclusion which can be drawn is that even if European 
foreign  policy  is  often  “unreflexively  Eurocentric”  (Bicchi  2006: 
287), policy reception matters. The bulk of academic publications 
on  the  ENP  has  referred  to  constructivist  or  sociological-
institutionalism  approaches  to  analyse  the  neighbourhood  policy. 
The point is not to deny the relevance of those approaches or to 
criticize the reference to enlargement: they allow to account for EU 
policy formulation. But this paper has shown that to a certain extent, 
EU external policy is a two-way process. Such conclusion is rather 
obvious in the case of Russia, based both upon its rejection of the 
ENP and its use of selected ENP instruments. But Ukraine has also 
accommodated  the  policy  to  its  own  preferences,  in  particular 
through policy and conditionality interpretations. Thus, ENP’s con-
tent and its outcomes are not predetermined, but are shaped through 
interactions during policy implementation. 
 
Analyzing the way Europe is seen from outside, thus, allows to shed 
a different light on EU foreign policy, and especially on a multi-
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